Executive Summary

On November 16th, 2026, the consumer privacy publication PrivacyAffairs and an independent security researcher reported that attacker JavaScript had been added to Optimizely Web Experimentation files served to visitors of major websites, including CNN, Zoom, and Optimizely's own site. The injected code loads a script that swaps cryptocurrency wallet addresses, captures payment card details, and sends cookies and page screenshots to attacker infrastructure.

Optimizely Web Experimentation is an A/B testing platform that serves one JavaScript file per customer from Optimizely's content delivery network. Because the malicious code sits in this trusted third-party script, a site's own servers can be clean while its visitors' payment and wallet data is exposed. Optimizely has not said whether its platform or customer accounts were breached.

Any organization that loads Optimizely Web Experimentation should treat itself as potentially affected. Given a live card skimmer and cryptocurrency clipper served through a third-party script and an unknown root cause, Beazley Security recommends affected organizations apply the mitigations below immediately and conduct a thorough review for any signs of compromise.

Affected Systems or Products

Product

Affected Versions

Fixed Versions

Optimizely Web Experimentation (customer project JavaScript served from cdn.optimizely.com)

Some customer project files observed on November 16th, 2026; full scope not disclosed

Not yet available

Mitigations / Workarounds

At the time of writing, Optimizely has not published a statement, root cause, or remediation guidance. Researchers found that not every Optimizely customer was affected, and several files rebuilt during the same day were clean. While the cause remains unknown, a file that is clean at one point in time may not stay clean.

Until Optimizely provides guidance, the following steps may help to reduce risk:

  • Download your Optimizely project file exactly as cdn.optimizely.com serves it, and review the "Project JavaScript" settings in your Optimizely project. Look for the domains listed under Indicators of Compromise or any script loader you did not add. A plain-text search can miss encoded variants: CNN's file carried a second copy that hid the address in Base64, and TalkTalk's carried a longer loader.

  • Consider removing the Optimizely snippet from the site until Optimizely explains what happened, starting with checkout, login, and payment pages.

  • Block 1688360[.]cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, and je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu in your Content-Security-Policy (CSP), and alert on script-src violation reports that name unknown hosts. On two affected sites, CSP blocked the payload from loading.

  • Review recent changes to Optimizely Project JavaScript and the accounts that made them. Limit write access to the people who need it, rotate Optimizely account credentials, and enforce multi-factor authentication. Either compromised customer accounts or a platform compromise could explain the injected code.

  • If payment card numbers pass through form fields that your own pages host, treat this as a possible card data breach and notify your payment processor. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) requires merchants to inventory the scripts on payment pages and monitor them for unauthorized changes.

Indicators of Compromise

Exploitation was confirmed on November 16th, 2026. That day, PrivacyAffairs and an independent researcher found the injected loader in live Optimizely project files and recovered the payload it fetches. At the time of writing, neither source has reported that the injected code was removed. The primary payload domain, 1688360[.]cc, was registered at 05:23 UTC on November 16th, and PrivacyAffairs notes that visits before that time could not have reached it. NOW TV's file, last rebuilt at 10:52 UTC that day, already contained the loader. The attacker has not been identified.

Search for requests to 1688360[.]cc (the paths /track.js, /hit.php, /card.php, and /html2canvas.min.js) and to the .icu domains in the table below. Review the following sources:

  • Proxy, DNS, and firewall logs.

  • CSP violation reports.

  • Client-side monitoring data, including sendBeacon calls to unknown hosts on checkout pages and html2canvas requests to hosts other than your own.

  • Your Optimizely project files, including historical copies if you keep them.

To check the file your site serves, use the exact Optimizely URL your pages load. It takes one of two forms:

cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project_id>.js

or

cdn.optimizely.com/public/<account_id>/s/<name>.js

A match on atob( is not malicious by itself, but it flags Base64 decoding for manual review.

curl -s "<optimizely_script_url>" | grep -E -i "1688360|5vobauua3ojpklx|eil786npto9u5bq|je4ft3gn8vxudum|atob\("

The attacker replacement wallet addresses below are listed in the header of track.js. Financial and fraud teams can use them to trace diverted transfers.

Indicator

Type

Description

Source

1688360[.]cc

Domain

Payload delivery and data collection host for the loader injected into Optimizely files; registered November 16th, 2026 at 05:23 UTC

PrivacyAffairs; amirulcyber.com

hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js

URL

Main payload: card skimmer, cryptocurrency clipper, and screenshot and cookie exfiltration

PrivacyAffairs; amirulcyber.com

hxxps://1688360[.]cc/card.php

URL

Card data exfiltration endpoint

PrivacyAffairs; amirulcyber.com

hxxps://1688360[.]cc/hit.php

URL

Exfiltration endpoint for page URL, cookies, screenshot, and original wallet addresses

PrivacyAffairs; amirulcyber.com

hxxps://1688360[.]cc/html2canvas.min.js

URL

Screenshot library served from attacker infrastructure

amirulcyber.com

5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu

Domain

iOS second-stage host serving boot.js

PrivacyAffairs; amirulcyber.com

hxxps://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js

URL

iOS second-stage script

amirulcyber.com

eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu

Domain

iOS second-stage host serving boot.js

PrivacyAffairs; amirulcyber.com

hxxps://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js

URL

iOS second-stage script (obfuscated)

amirulcyber.com

hxxps://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html

URL

Attacker-hosted page on the iOS second-stage host, listed for blocking by the researcher

amirulcyber.com

je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu

Domain

Domain recommended for CSP blocking alongside the campaign infrastructure

PrivacyAffairs

f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40

SHA256

track.js payload

amirulcyber.com

2f69879f1c5bdfe9c075ef67ddb6405afe992aff89dcf42863567f83237d3ba6

SHA256

boot.js served from eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu

amirulcyber.com

0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e

Other

Attacker replacement Ethereum (ETH) address

amirulcyber.com

19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW

Other

Attacker replacement Bitcoin (BTC) address

amirulcyber.com

THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa

Other

Attacker replacement Tron (TRX) address

amirulcyber.com

UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p

Other

Attacker replacement TON address (friendly format)

amirulcyber.com

0:2033556a49942224b486e70fa8beeaeae4265dc4b10adffec2326c002d30397b

Other

Attacker replacement TON address (raw format)

amirulcyber.com

FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n

Other

Attacker replacement Solana (SOL) address

amirulcyber.com

ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5

Other

Attacker replacement Litecoin (LTC) address

amirulcyber.com

qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58

Other

Attacker replacement Bitcoin Cash (BCH) address

amirulcyber.com

DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

Other

Attacker replacement Dogecoin (DOGE) address

amirulcyber.com

Threat Intelligence

Researchers found the loader in Optimizely files on news, software, telecommunications, and insurance websites. Through other routes, the payload also loaded on news, retail, and travel websites. PrivacyAffairs downloaded each file between 20:33 and 20:36 UTC on November 16th. It confirmed the loader in the Optimizely files of Optimizely itself, NOW TV, CNN, Virgin Media, and TalkTalk, and found the files of Channel 4, American Eagle, and Marks & Spencer clean. In separate page captures, the independent researcher found the same loader in Optimizely files used by CNN, Zoom, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, Hootsuite, Smartsheet, Virgin Media O2, Stamps.com, Tricentis, Mutual of Omaha, and HSBC Insurance Singapore. That researcher also observed the payload loading through other routes on three sites: an advertising wrapper on Fox News, a first-party script on American Eagle, and a Jscrambler-protected script on Air France's Italian site. No other source has confirmed these other routes.

Neither source has attributed the activity. PrivacyAffairs noted that targeting only older iOS versions resembles the iPhone exploit kits behind recent malicious advertising on Dutch news sites, but it stated that it has not confirmed this link.

This incident follows several recent attacks that turned shared website scripts against downstream sites:

Technical Details

Optimizely Web Experimentation delivers each customer's experiments through a single JavaScript file. Sites load it from

cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project_id>.js

or a

cdn.optimizely.com/public/<account_id>/s/<name>.js

path. The file contains the customer's tests plus any custom code entered as "Project JavaScript", and it runs on every page that includes it. In the infected files, the last line of that custom code is the same one-liner. It is a self-invoking function inside a try/catch block that creates a script element with its source set to

hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js

, marks it async, and appends it to the document head. The independent researcher found the line in GitLab's project file (5113954737848320.js) and in ten other project and snippet IDs belonging to unrelated organizations. On Zoom's site, a OneTrust consent stub controlled when the Optimizely file loaded but did not clean its contents.

The root cause is not known. PrivacyAffairs observed that the infected files were last rebuilt at different times through November 16th, from 10:52 UTC (NOW TV) to 20:32 UTC (TalkTalk), while other customers' files rebuilt that day stayed clean. It concluded that someone with write access to either Optimizely's systems or the affected customers' accounts inserted the code. Optimizely has not said which.

The independent researcher describes track.js as one self-contained script with four modules. PrivacyAffairs describes it as about 30 KB of plain, commented JavaScript.

  • Cryptocurrency clipper. The script uses regular expressions to find Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin, and TON addresses, then validates each match with the correct checksum for that currency. It replaces matches in page text every 50 milliseconds, but only on pages that contain payment keywords. It also rewrites form fields (including framework data models), link and image targets, copy events, clipboard reads and writes, navigator.share, and the URLs and bodies of fetch and XMLHttpRequest calls.

  • Screenshot and cookie exfiltration. The script posts the following to /hit.php:

    • The page URL (up to 500 characters).

    • Cookies (up to 8,000 characters).

    • A JPEG screenshot rendered with html2canvas, which it fetches from the same attacker host.

    • The original wallet addresses it replaced.

PrivacyAffairs states that this happens the first time the clipper swaps an address.

  • Card skimmer. The script hooks form submissions and POST bodies sent through fetch and XMLHttpRequest, including JSON, FormData, and nested objects. It looks for card numbers that pass the Luhn checksum and a card brand check, together with a valid MM/YY expiry date and a 3- or 4-digit security code. It removes duplicates within a session and sends results to /card.php with sendBeacon. PrivacyAffairs notes that the script cannot read card fields that a payment provider hosts in its own iframe (for example Stripe or Adyen), so sites that collect card numbers in their own forms face the highest risk.

  • iOS second stage. On iPhone, iPad, and iPod devices only, the script injects boot.js from two .icu domains. On iOS or iPadOS 18.6 and earlier, it also adds a hidden iframe that, according to PrivacyAffairs, loads further code. The recovered boot.js is obfuscated, and neither source has published an analysis of it or of the iframe content at the time of writing. PrivacyAffairs reports that one of the .icu domains was registered at 16:38 UTC on November 16th.

The analysis comes from PrivacyAffairs, which read track.js as text without running it, and from the independent researcher who published it as "OPTIMJACK" on amirulcyber.com. That researcher recommends testing staging pages with a canary wallet address to detect the clipper: paste the address, submit the form, and compare the submitted value. The researcher notes that the page text sweep only runs on pages with payment keywords, so a canary test on a page without them can miss part of the clipper's behavior.

How Beazley Security is responding

Beazley Security is monitoring client perimeter devices through our Exposure Management Platform to identify impacted devices and support organizations in remediation of any issues found.

We are also conducting threat hunts across our MDR environment to detect potential exploitation attempts against our clients.

If you believe your organization may have been impacted by this attack campaign and need support, please contact our Incident Response team.