Executive Summary

On December 9th, text editor application Notepad++ reported an incident where some of their software update infrastructure had been hijacked to deliver sophisticated backdoor malware to specific targets. Rapid7 published some additional analysis on one of the payloads delivered and attributed the campaign to Chinese state sponsored APT group Lotus Blossom.

The attack appears to be highly targeted, as reporting indicates only specific traffic results in malicious packages delivered. Reporting from Kaspersky added that attacker infrastructure was constantly rotated and tailored to attack specific intended targets.

The incident was a man-in-the-middle attack against the update infrastructure, not against Notepad++ code itself. Because the attack compromised the update process, Beazley Security, out of an abundance of caution, recommends affected users delete existing versions of Notepad++ and install fixed versions from scratch as soon as possible.

Affected Systems or Products

Product

Affected Version

Fixed Version

Notepad++

< v.8.8.9

>= v8.8.9

Patches

Security fixes were made available at the time of reporting and are available via normal update channels. Because the attack compromised the update process, Beazley Security, out of an abundance of caution, recommends users delete current installs of Notepad++ and install patched versions from scratch as soon as possible.

Indicators of Compromise

IOCs have been provided by both Rapid7 and Kaspersky, though their usefulness may be limited as the threat actor has been observed rotating out almost all pieces of infrastructure from C2 servers to malware families and payload hashes.

That said, we will include a limited summary of them here to assist with threat hunts.

IoC

Type

Notes

8ea8b83645fba6e23d48075a0d3fc73ad2ba515b4536710cda4f1f232718f53e

sha256

NSIS script

77bfea78def679aa1117f569a35e8fd1542df21f7e00e27f192c907e61d63a2e

sha256

Encrypted shellcode

3bdc4c0637591533f1d4198a72a33426c01f69bd2e15ceee547866f65e26b7ad

sha256

Malicious sideloaded DLL

0a9b8df968df41920b6ff07785cbfebe8bda29e6b512c94a3b2a83d10014d2fd

sha256

Loader Variant

e7cd605568c38bd6e0aba31045e1633205d0598c607a855e2e1bca4cca1c6eda

sha256

Loader Variant

b4169a831292e245ebdffedd5820584d73b129411546e7d3eccf4663d5fc5be3

sha256

Loader Variant

fcc2765305bcd213b7558025b2039df2265c3e0b6401e4833123c461df2de51a

sha256

Loader Variant

8e6e505438c21f3d281e1cc257abdbf7223b7f5a

sha1

NSIS installer

573549869e84544e3ef253bdba79851dcde4963a

sha1

NSIS installer

d7ffd7b588880cf61b603346a3557e7cce648c93

sha1

NSIS installer

6444dab57d93ce987c22da66b3706d5d7fc226da

sha1

DLL

2ab0758dda4e71aee6f4c8e4c0265a796518f07d

sha1

DLL

f7910d943a013eede24ac89d6388c1b98f8b3717

sha1

DLL

defb05d5a91e4920c9e22de2d81c5dc9b95a9a7c

sha1

ProShow.exe

06a6a5a39193075734a32e0235bde0e979c27228

sha1

load

bf996a709835c0c16cce1015e6d44fc95e08a38a

sha1

script.exe

ca4b6fe0c69472cd3d63b212eb805b7f65710d33

sha1

alien.ini

821c0cafb2aab0f063ef7e313f64313fc81d46cd

sha1

4c9aac447bf732acc97992290aa7a187b967ee2c

sha1

90e677d7ff5844407b9c073e3b7e896e078e11cd

sha1

api.skycloudcenter[.]com

hostname

C2

api.wiresguard[.]com

hostname

C2

cdncheck.it[.]com

hostname

C2

self-dns.it[.]com

hostname

C2

safe-dns.it[.]com

hostname

C2

59.110.7[.]32

IP

C2

124.222.137[.]114

IP

C2

45.76.155[.]202

IP

Malware Host

45.77.31[.]210

IP

C2

45.32.144[.]255

IP

C2

95.179.213[.]0

IP

C2

Technical Details

The attack itself was limited in scope; a former hosting provider for Notepad++ had a server compromised sometime in June 2025, and the threat actors persisted access until December 2025. In that time the threat actor was selectively redirecting specific targeted users to trojaned, malicious update packages. The attack was narrow to a degree that analysis from Kaspersky indicates as few as a dozen individual machines were specifically targeted. Changes referenced in Notepad++’s patch notes indicate that this man-in-the-middle supply chain attack was possible because of a lack of signature verification in the updater programs and on update server XMLs returned to the client.

Notepad++ has changed hosting providers for their update infrastructure and fixed their update process to include more strict signing certificate checks.

How Beazley Security is responding

Beazley Security has conducted threat hunts across our MDR environment to detect potential attempts to hijack client Notepad++ installations leveraging the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) listed in this advisory. Beazley Security MDR will reach out to any impacted organizations and work to contain potential threat actors.

If you believe your organization may have been impacted by this attack campaign and need support, please contact our Incident Response team.